Around 1487, Leonardo da Vinci began research in the area of anthropometrics. The Vitruvian Man, one of his most famous drawings, can be described as one of the earliest sources presenting guidelines for anthropometry. [Figure 14-7]
Around the same time, he also began to study the flight of birds. He grasped that humans are too heavy and not strong enough to fly using wings simply attached to the arms. Therefore, he sketched a device in which the aviator lies down on a plank and works two large, membranous wings using hand levers, foot pedals, and a system of pulleys. [Figure 14-8]
Today, anthropometry plays a considerable role in the fields of computer design, design for access and maintainability, simplicity of instructions, and ergonomic issues.
In the early 1900s, industrial engineers Frank and Lillian Gilbreth were trying to reduce human error in medicine. [Figures 14-9 and 14-10]
They developed the concept of using call backs when communicating in the operating room. For example, the doctor says “scalpel” and the nurse repeats “scalpel” and then hands it to the doctor. That is called the challenge-response system. Speaking out loud reinforces what tool is needed and provides the doctor with an opportunity to correct his/herself if it is not the necessary tool. This same verbal protocol is used in aviation today. Pilots are required to read back instructions or clearances given by air traffic control (ATC) to ensure that the pilot receives the correct instructions and gives ATC an opportunity to correct if the information is wrong. Frank and Lillian Gilbreth also are known for their research on fatigue.
Also in the early 1900s, Orville and Wilbur Wright were the first to fly a powered aircraft and also pioneered many human factors considerations. While others were trying to develop aircraft with a high degree of aerodynamic stability, the Wrights intentionally designed unstable aircraft with cerebralized control modeled after the flight of birds. Between 1901 and 1903, the brothers worked with large gliders at Kill Devil Hills, near Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, to develop the first practical human interactive controls for aircraft pitch, roll, and yaw. On December 17, 1903, they made four controlled powered flights over the dunes at Kitty Hawk with their Wright Flyer. [Figure 14-11]
They later developed practical in-flight control of engine power, plus an angle of attack sensor and stick pusher that reduced pilot workload. The brothers’ flight demonstrations in the United States and Europe during 1908-1909 awakened the world to the new age of controlled flight. Orville was the first aviator to use a seat belt and also introduced a rudder boost/ trim control that gave the pilot greater control authority. The Wrights’ flight training school in Dayton, Ohio included a flight simulator of their own design. The Wrights patented their practical airplane and flight control concepts, many of which are still in use today.
Prior to World War I, the only test of human to machine compatibility was that of trial and error. If the human functioned with the machine, he was accepted, if not he was rejected. There was a significant change in the concern for humans during the American Civil War. The U.S. Patent Office was concerned about whether the mass-produced uniforms and new weapons could be used effectively by the infantry men.
Evolution of Maintenance Human Factors
With the onset of World War I (1914–1918), more sophisticated equipment was being developed and the inability of personnel to use such systems led to an increased interest in human capability. Up to this point, the focus of aviation psychology was on the pilot, but as time progressed, the focus shifted onto the aircraft. Of particular concern was the design of the controls and displays, the effects of altitude, and environmental factors on the pilot. The war also brought on the need for aeromedical research and the need for testing and measurement methods. By the end of World War I, two aeronautical labs were established, one at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, and the other at Wright Field outside of Dayton, Ohio.
Another significant development was in the civilian sector, where the effects of illumination on worker productivity were examined. This led to the identification of the Hawthorne Effect, which suggested that motivational factors could significantly influence human performance.
With the onset of World War II (1939–1945), it was becoming increasingly harder to match individuals to pre-existing jobs. Now the design of equipment had to take into account human limitations and take advantage of human capabilities. This change took time as there was a lot of research still to be done to determine the human capabilities and limitations. An example of this is the 1947 study done by Fitts and Jones on the most effective configuration of control knobs to be used in aircraft flight decks. Much of this research transitioned into other equipment with the aim of making the controls and displays easier for the operators to use.
Unfortunately, all the “lessons learned” in the WWII studies of group dynamics, and flight crew communication were seemingly forgotten after the war. Post WWII aircrew studies continued to focus primarily on flight crews, especially pilot selection, simulator training, and cockpit layout and design.
Subsequent studies of the technician focused on his or her individual competency, and included equipment design (ergonomics). The Vietnam Conflict brought the quest for greater safety, and with that, came a systematic approach for error reduction. This increased attention brought both good and bad changes. It led to the “Zero Defects” quality programs in maintenance and manufacturing. Generally, this had a positive effect. However, it also led to “crackdown programs” which were one-way communication from management (the infamous “my way or the highway” approach). This concept is more dictatorial than democratic, and typically had a long-term negative effect on the company. This “crackdown” approach for behavior control is based upon fear and punishment, which creates a problem. Errors are driven into hiding, and then become apparent later, usually at a more critical time (“Murphy’s Law”). Additional attempts to develop “foolproof” equipment designs were added to the zero-defect manufacturing goal and began to find recognition in the maintenance world as well. Subsequent efforts focused on effects of positive rather than negative motivators. The results of this effort were a reversal of the “crackdown” method, and motivation due to increased morale often improved maintenance safety performance. Studies have shown that motivation resulting from negative sources seldom achieved the same effect. This led to a “Participative Management” style recognized by some U.S. industry and a few airlines, but did not reach maintenance operations until much later.
The Airline Deregulation (1978 –1988) effort had a profound effect upon the aviation community. Prior to 1978, the airline industry was regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. This resulted in peaceful markets, stable routes, and consistent air fares. However, there was a downside consisting of two major problems: wasteful management practices and excessively high wages compared to other comparable skilled-labor industries. The Airline Deregulation Act brought in competitive business practices, with routes and fares controlled by their profitability. This led to a new style of airline management in which a CEO was more of a business person and less knowledgeable of aviation. Existing airlines developed new routes and added new kinds of service and style. Start-up airlines brought other innovative ideas. The numerous mergers and acquisitions added an increasing pressure to focus on the financial bottom line. Doing more with less became the byline. In the 1980s, maintenance departments were not immune to the pressures of mergers and staff reductions. However, fleets were extremely reliable at that time, and significant savings were aided by a reduction in number of maintenance technicians. Other new ways of conducting business included leasing of aircraft and outsourcing of maintenance. A result of deregulation was change for the maintenance programs (both personnel and departmental) and the pressure to produce and adjust. The problem, however, was that human factors for aviation maintenance is still stuck in the 1960s model.
A detailed review of aviation literature published between 1976 and 1987 had very little to say about maintenance. Out of 50 published articles, only 15 even mention maintenance. Most of these articles deal with ergonomics, one article examines military engine design to “solider proof” the maintenance duties, and one U.S. Navy article advocated more management control.
As human factors awareness progressed, a “culture change” occurred in U.S. carriers in the 1990s. Management behavior began to change; there were practical applications of systems thinking; organization structure was revised; and new strategy, policy, and values emerged. Virtually all of these involved communication and collaboration. One example is in 1991, when Continental Airlines began “CRM type” training in maintenance. They saw the importance of improving communication, teamwork, and participative decision making. A second example is when United Airlines instituted a change in organization and the job of design of inspectors. They remained more accessible during heavy maintenance and overhaul and stayed in closer communication with mechanics during normal repairs. This resulted in fewer turnbacks and higher quality. A third example is when Southwest Airlines created and sustained a strong and clear organizational structure led by the CEO. This resulted in open and positive communication between the maintenance and other departments. A final example is when TWA instituted a new program to improve communication between the maintenance trade union and maintenance management. This resulted in improved quality.